



The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Syllabus

DGSIR SEMINAR; INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS - 58912

Last update 06-08-2019

HU Credits: 4

Degree/Cycle: 2nd degree (Master)

Responsible Department: International Relations

Academic year: 0

Semester: 1st Semester

Teaching Languages: English

Campus: Mt. Scopus

Course/Module Coordinator: Yoram Haftel

Coordinator Email: yoram.haftel@mail.huji.ac.il

Coordinator Office Hours: Tuesday 11:00 - 12:00

Teaching Staff:

Prof Yoram Haftel

Course/Module description:

This course is designed for graduate students and explores topic of international political economy with a focus on the role of international institutions in shaping the relationship between wealth and power in the global arena. We examine the factors that create international institutions, shape their design, as well as the impact of such institutions on the global economy, and the relationship between institutions and the interests of different players in the international system.

Course/Module aims:

The purpose of the seminar is to familiarize students with political economy approaches to international institutions and providing them with tools necessary for the analysis of seminal and cutting edge research in this field.

Learning outcomes - On successful completion of this module, students should be able to:

At the end of the course students will know and comprehend institutional approaches to international political economy and will be able to understand and analyze extant research in the field.

Attendance requirements(%):

100

Teaching arrangement and method of instruction: The course is organized as an open discussion in which students demonstrate knowledge of and evaluate the reading material. Each session begins with short presentations of the students, followed by class discussion of weekly readings.

Course/Module Content:

1. Introduction
2. The formation of the international economic system
3. Hegemonic stability theory
4. Hegemony and Institutions
5. New Approaches
6. International Trade
7. Regional Integration
8. Foreign investment

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9. Dispute Settlement
 10. IMF
 11. Populism and Globalization

Required Reading:

Cohen, Benjamin J. 2007. *The Transatlantic Divide: Why are American and British IPE so Different?* *Review of International Political Economy* 14 (2): 197-219.

Martin, Lisa L. and Beth A. Simmons. 2013. *International Organizations and Institutions*. In *Handbook of International Relations*, 2nd Edition, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 326-351 (Sage Publications).

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. Chapters 3-4 (Crown).

North, Douglas C. 1981. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. Chapters 1-6 (W. W. Norton).

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. *The Capitalist World Economy*, pp. 1-48 (Cambridge UP).

Kindleberger, Charles. 1981. *Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides*. *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (5): 242-254.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. *State Power and the Structure of International Trade*. *World Politics* 28 (3): 317-347.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action* Chapters 1-2.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985. *The Limits of Hegemonic Stability*. *International Organization* 39 (4): 579-614.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-7.

Ruggie, John G. 1982. *International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post War Economic Order*. *International Organization* 36(2): 379-415.

Yarbrough, Beth V., and Robert M. Yarbrough. 1987. *Cooperation in the liberalization of international trade: after hegemony, what?* *International Organization* 41 (1): 1-26.

Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. *The Concept of Legalization*. *International Organization*

54(3): 401-419.

Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. 2006. "Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory." In *Delegation and Agency in International Relations*, edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 3-39.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. *The Rational Design of International Institutions*. *International Organization* 55 (4): 761-799.

Hiscox, Michael. 2001. *Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade*. *International Organization* 55 (1):1-46.

Milner, Helen V. 1987. *Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s*. *International Organization* 41 (4): 639-665.

Oatley, Thomas. 2011. *The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy*. *International Organization* 65 (2): 311-342.

Rogowski Ronald. 1987. *Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade*. *American Political Science Review* 81 (4): 1121-1137.

Garrett, Geoffrey G., and Peter Lange. 1995. *Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change*. *International Organization* 49 (4): 627-655.

Goldstein, Judith. 1996. *International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American "Unfair" Trade Laws*. *International Organization* 50 (4): 541-64.

Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. *Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries*. *International Organization* 52(4): 787-824.

Allee, Todd L., and Jamie E. Scalera. 2012. *The Divergent Effects of Joining International Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession*. *International Organization* 66 (2): 243-276.

Davis, Christina L. 2004. *International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization*. *American Political Science Review* 98: 153-1.

Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. *Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade*. *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67.

Rose, Andrew K. 2004. *Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?* *American Economic Review* 94 (1): 98-114.

Haftel, Yoram Z. *Forthcoming. Commerce and Institutions: Trade, Scope, and the Design of Regional Economic Organizations. The Review of International Organizations.*

Mattli, Walter. 1999. *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (Princeton UP). Chapters 1-3.

Smith, James McCall. 2000. *The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts.* *International Organization* 54 (1):137-180.

Elkins, Zachary, Guzman, Andrew T. and Simmons, Beth A. 2006. *Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000.* *International Organization*, 60 (4): 811-846.

Haftel, Yoram Z, and Alexander Thompson. 2013. *Delayed Ratification: The Domestic Fate of Bilateral Investment Treaties.* *International Organization* 67 (2): 355-387.

Poulsen, Lauge Skovgaard. *Forthcoming. Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties.* *International Studies Quarterly.*

Allee, Todd and Peinhardt, Clint. 2011. *Contingent Credibility: The Reputational Effects of Investment Treaty Disputes on Foreign Direct Investment.* *International Organization* 65(3): 401-432.

Büthe, Tim. and Helen V. Milner. 2008. *The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?* *American Journal of Political Science* 52: 741-762.

Yackee, Jason W. 2008. *Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?* *Law and Society Review* 42 (4): 805-832.

Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. 1999. *Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments.* *International Organization* 53 (1): 71-98.

Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. *Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes.* *International Organization* 56 (4): 863-889.

Frieden, Jeffry A. 1991. *Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance.* *International Organization* 45 (4): 425-451.

Copelovitch, Mark S. 2010. *Master or Servant? Common Agency, Preference*

Heterogeneity, and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. International Studies Quarterly 54 (1): 49-77.

Simmons, Beth A. 2000. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. American Political Science Review 94 (4): 819-835.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, James Raymond Vreeland. 2009. Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council. European Economic Review 53 (7): 742-757.

Gutner, Tamar. 2005. World Bank Environmental Reform: Revisiting Lessons from Agency Theory. International Organization 59 (3): 773-783.

Nielson, Daniel and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to international organizations: Agency theory and World Bank environmental reform. International Organization 57(2):241-76.

Nielson, Daniel, and Michael J. Tierney (2005). Theory, Data, and Hypothesis Testing: World Bank Environmental Reform Redux. International Organization, 59 (3): 785-800.

Weaver, Catherine. 2007. The World's Bank and the Bank's World. Global Governance 13 (4): 493-512.

Additional Reading Material:

Course/Module evaluation:

End of year written/oral examination 0 %

Presentation 0 %

Participation in Tutorials 20 %

Project work 50 %

Assignments 0 %

Reports 30 %

Research project 0 %

Quizzes 0 %

Other 0 %

Additional information:

Students can choose between a term paper and a take-home exam