Syllabus - כלכלה ומוסדות בינלאומיים: קורס יסוד לתלמידי מחקר (58912)

חומר חובה לקריאה:
Cohen, Benjamin J. 2007. The Transatlantic Divide: Why are American and British IPE so Different? Review of International Political Economy 14 (2): 197-219.

Martin, Lisa L. and Beth A. Simmons. 2013. International Organizations and Institutions. In Handbook of International Relations, 2nd Edition, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 326-351 (Sage Publications).

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Chapters 3-4 (Crown).
North, Douglas C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. Chapters 1-6 (W. W. Norton).

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. The Capitalist World Economy, pp. 1-48 (Cambridge UP).

Kindleberger, Charles. 1981. Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides. International Studies Quarterly 25 (5): 242-254.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. World Politics 28 (3): 317-347.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action Chapters 1-2.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985. The Limits of Hegemonic Stability. International Organization 39 (4): 579-614.

Keohane, Robert O.1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-7.

Ruggie, John G. 1982. International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post War Economic Order. International Organization 36(2): 379-415.

Yarbrough, Beth V., and Robert M. Yarbrough. 1987. Cooperation in the liberalization of international trade: after hegemony, what? International Organization 41 (1): 1-26.

Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. The Concept of Legalization. International Organization 54(3): 401-419.

Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. 2006. “Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory.” In Delegation and Agency in International Relations, edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 3–39.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. International Organization 55 (4): 761-799.

Hiscox, Michael. 2001. Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade. International Organization 55 (1):1-46.

Milner, Helen V. 1987. Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s. International Organization 41 (4): 639-665.

Oatley, Thomas. 2011. The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy. International Organization 65 (2): 311-342.

Rogowski Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. American Political Science Review 81 (4): 1121-1137.

Garrett, Geoffrey G., and Peter Lange. 1995. Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change. International Organization 49 (4): 627-655.

Goldstein, Judith. 1996. International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American “Unfair” Trade Laws. International Organization 50 (4): 541-64.

Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. International Organization 52(4): 787-824.

Allee, Todd L., and Jamie E. Scalera. 2012. The Divergent Effects of Joining International Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession. International Organization 66 (2): 243-276.

Davis, Christina L. 2004. International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. American Political Science Review 98: 153-1.

Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. International Organization 61(1): 37–67.

Rose, Andrew K. 2004. Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade? American Economic Review 94 (1): 98-114.

Haftel, Yoram Z. Forthcoming. Commerce and Institutions: Trade, Scope, and the Design of Regional Economic Organizations. The Review of International Organizations.

Mattli, Walter. 1999. The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (Princeton UP). Chapters 1-3.

Smith, James McCall. 2000. The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts. International Organization 54 (1):137-180.

Elkins, Zachary, Guzman, Andrew T. and Simmons, Beth A. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000. International Organization, 60 (4): 811-846.

Haftel, Yoram Z, and Alexander Thompson. 2013. Delayed Ratification: The Domestic Fate of Bilateral Investment Treaties. International Organization 67 (2): 355-387.

Poulsen, Lauge Skovgaard. Forthcoming. Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties. International Studies Quarterly.

Allee, Todd and Peinhardt, Clint. 2011. Contingent Credibility: The Reputational Effects of Investment Treaty Disputes on Foreign Direct Investment. International Organization 65(3): 401-432.

Büthe, Tim. and Helen V. Milner. 2008. The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements? American Journal of Political Science 52: 741-762.

Yackee, Jason W. 2008. Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Law and Society Review 42 (4): 805-832.

Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. 1999. Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments. International Organization 53 (1): 71-98.

Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes. International Organization 56 (4): 863-889.

Frieden, Jeffry A. 1991. Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. International Organization 45 (4): 425-451.

Copelovitch, Mark S. 2010. Master or Servant? Common Agency, Preference Heterogeneity, and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. International Studies Quarterly 54 (1): 49-77.

Simmons, Beth A. 2000. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. American Political Science Review 94 (4): 819-835.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, James Raymond Vreeland. 2009. Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council. European Economic Review 53 (7): 742-757.

Gutner, Tamar. 2005. World Bank Environmental Reform: Revisiting Lessons from Agency Theory. International Organization 59 (3): 773-783.

Nielson, Daniel and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to international organizations: Agency theory and World Bank environmental reform. International Organization 57(2):241-76.

Nielson, Daniel, and Michael J. Tierney (2005). Theory, Data, and Hypothesis Testing: World Bank Environmental Reform Redux. International Organization, 59 (3): 785-800.

Weaver, Catherine. 2007. The World's Bank and the Bank's World. Global Governance 13 (4): 493-512.

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