



The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Syllabus

Coercion in International Relations: Deterrence Compellence and Coercive Diplomacy - 58895

Last update 31-12-2023

HU Credits: 4

Degree/Cycle: 2nd degree (Master)

Responsible Department: International Relations

Academic year: 0

Semester: 1st Semester

Teaching Languages: Hebrew

Campus: Mt. Scopus

Course/Module Coordinator: Dr. Daniel Sobelman

Coordinator Email: Daniel.sobelman@mail.huji.ac.il

Coordinator Office Hours: Coordination via email

Teaching Staff:

Dr. Daniel Sobelman

Course/Module description:

In international relations, actors aspire to achieve desirable outcome and prevent undesirable outcome. Whether one is a superpower, a state, or a violent non-state actor—all actors want their capabilities to matter. It is thus counter-intuitive that sheer military strength and a favorable balance of power do not guarantee that actors will get their way in international affairs, let alone achieve decisive outcomes. International Relations literature tells us that the United States, for example, practices successful coercion less than half the time. Conversely, weak actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah often get their way at the expense of militarily superior states. What is coercion and what is it a function of? What determines whether it fails or succeeds? Tackling these questions, this course will discuss the manner in which coercion is being impacted by the ever-increasing availability of advanced technology, the advent of globalization, and the diffusion of military power.

Course/Module aims:

The course will provide students with the conceptual tools, as well as with a contemporary and historical knowledge to grasp the manner in which actors pursue coercive strategies to impact others' behavior and shape their own strategic environment.

Learning outcomes - On successful completion of this module, students should be able to:

Master the fundamental principles and scholarly vocabulary pertaining to coercion

Differentiate among the various theoretical phenomena and strategies associated with coercive behavior and strategy

Harness the knowledge acquired in the course in to analyze and explain crises and conflicts in the Israeli and global arenas

Critically analyze the manner in which actors have pursued coercive strategies in a bid to achieve their interests

Attendance requirements(%):

Up to three unexcused absences

Teaching arrangement and method of instruction: Seminar

Course/Module Content:

Introduction

How does coercion work? What is power, and how is credibility achieved in international relations? Discussing the evolution of the theoretical debate about the conditions for successful coercion.

Deterrence and Compellence before World War II

The era of the 'Absolute Weapon': deterrence as a theory and strategy after 1945

The Cuban Missile Crisis—The formative event of the Cold War. How did President Kennedy succeed at compelling the Soviet Union to remove the nuclear missiles from Cuba? Was the most famous case of compellence in modern history a strategic success or sheer luck?

Dr. Strangelove: Screening, Analysis, Discussion

From nuclear deterrence to conventional and sub-conventional deterrence

In the age of 'complex deterrence': Are terrorists deterrable?

The evolution of deterrence in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict: from tactical rules of the game to strategic equations

Escalations, Rounds, Wars, Cease-Fires: deterrence failure and success between Israel and the Gaza Strip

Influence and coercion in the cyber realm

Extended coercion: Israel, the United States, and Iran's nuclear program

Economic coercion: the debate over the impact and effectiveness of economic sanctions

Required Reading:

Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 12-18.

Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power," *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Spring, 1980), pp. 3-35.

Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 1-20.

Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 11-37.

Stephen J. Cimbala, *Coercive Military Strategy* (Austin: Texas A&M University Press, 1998), pp. 43-68.

"Dr. Strangelove, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb" (1964).

John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 23-66.

Daniel Sobelman, "Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict 2006-16," *International Security* (Winter 2016/17), pp. 151-196.

Itai Brun, "While You Were Busy Making Other Plans -- The Other RMA," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 33, No. 4 (August 2010), pp. 535-565.

עמית שיניאק, "התהוות המדינה במרחב הספר המקוון: השוואה תיאורטית והיסטורית", בין הקטבים, גיליון 3 (דצמבר, 2014), עמ' 13-44.

"Zero Days," directed by Alex Gibney (New York: Magnolia Pictures, 2016).

Daniel Sobelman, "Restraining an Ally: Israel, the United States, and Iran's Nuclear Program, 2011-2012," *Texas National Security Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (August, 2018).

Juan C. Zarate, *Treasury's War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), pp. 15-44.

Additional Reading Material:

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1966), pp. 69-91, 116-125.

Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 187-203.

Jack. S. Levy, "Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (August, 2008), pp. 537-552.

John A. Warden III, "Success in Modern War: A Response to Robert Pape's *Bombing to Win*," *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 172-190.

R. J. Overy, "Airpower and the Logic of Deterrence Theory before 1939," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1992), pp. 73-101.

George H. Quester, *Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 1-16.

Alan Alexandroff and Richard Rosencrance, "Deterrence in 1939," *World Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (April, 1977), pp. 404-424.

Samuel W. Wells, "The Origins of Massive Retaliation," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 96, No. 1 (Spring, 1981), pp. 31-52.

Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 215-242.

Bernard Brodie, "War in the Atomic Age," in Bernard Brodie (ed.), *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), pp. 21-69.

Glenn Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in Paul Seabury (ed.) *Balance of Power* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), pp. 184-201.

Rudolf E. Peierls, *Atomic Histories* (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1997), pp. 187-194.

Herman Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable*, (New York: Boulder, 1962).

Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *The Essence of Decision*, Second Edition, 1999.

Alexander L. George, "The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962," in Alexander L. George,

David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 86-143.

Jonathan Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 5-33.

John Stone, "Conventional Deterrence and the Challenge of Credibility," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2012), pp. 108-123.

Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: it Can Be Done," *International Security* Vol. 30 No. 3 (Winter 2005/6), pp. 87-123.

Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Toward a new Research Agenda," *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 54 (2010), pp. 705-732.

Emanuel Adler, "Complex Deterrence in Asymmetric-Warfare Era," in T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James W. Wirtz (eds.) *Complex Deterrence* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 85-108.

Alex S. Wilner, "Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 34 No. 1 (2011), pp. 3-37.

Graham Allison, "Why ISIS Fears Israel," *The National Interest*, August 8, 2016.

יגיל הנקין, "ומה את לא הרתענו את חזבאללה?", צבא ואסטרטגיה, כרך 6, גיליון 3 (דצמבר 2014), עמ' 109-130.

Charles D. Freilich, "Why Israel Can't Win Wars Anymore," *Survival* (March 2015), pp. 72-92.

Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr. and Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 70, No. 3 (September, 1955), p. 325., Vol. 70, No. 3 (Sep., 1955), pp. 321-340.

Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security*, Vol. 26 No. (2001), pp. 93-128.

Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1975), pp. 175-200.

מוני חורב, "מבצעי הרתעה: מה ניתן ללמוד מהניסיון הצה"לי ברצועת עזה?" עיונים בביטחון המזרח התיכון מס' 15, (מרכז בגין-סאדאת למחקרים אסטרטגיים, אוקטובר 2015).

רס"ן א', "ניצחון מהאוויר: אסטרטגיה של מלחמות הרתעה", בין הקטבים גיליון (11-12), עמ' 65-78.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace*, *International Security* Vol. 41, No. 4 (Winter 2016/17), pp. 44-71.

Erica D. Borghard & Shawn W. Lonergan, "The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace," *Security Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2017), pp. 452-481.

Travis Sharp, "On Cyber Coercion: Lessons from the Sony Hack that We Should Have Learned, But Didn't," *War on the Rocks*, June 1, 2017.

Robert Jervis, "Getting to Yes with Iran: The Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 92 No. 1 (January/February 2013), pp. 105-115.

David Vital, *The Survival of Small States* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 13-53.

Daniel Sobelman, "Lessons for the U.S. from Israel's Iran Experience," *Iran Matters*, Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, August 21, 2017.

Daniel W. Drezner, *The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion*, *International Organization*, Vol. 57 (Summer 2003), pp. 643-659.

Nader Habibi, "The Iranian Economy in the Shadow of Economic Sanctions," *Middle East Brief*, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, No. 31 (October, 2008).

Robert A. Pape, *Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work*, *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2, (Autumn, 1997), 90-136.

Grading Scheme:

Essay / Project / Final Assignment / Home Exam / Referat 60 %

Active Participation / Team Assignment 20 %

Submission assignments during the semester: Exercises / Essays / Audits / Reports / Forum / Simulation / others 20 %

Additional information:

This class can be taken as a "regular" four-point course, or as an eight-point seminar.

The course requirements are a mid-semester report, approximately 3,000-word-long, and a final paper of about the same length.

Those taking this class as a seminar will need, in addition to the aforementioned requirements, to submit an approximately 22-page seminar and present their topic in class.