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Syllabus Behavioral Economics - 57725
עברית
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Last update 05-11-2015
HU Credits: 4

Degree/Cycle: 1st degree (Bachelor)

Responsible Department: economics

Semester: Yearly

Teaching Languages: Hebrew

Campus: Mt. Scopus

Course/Module Coordinator: Prof Eyal Winter

Coordinator Email: eyal.winter@mail.huji.ac.il

Coordinator Office Hours:

Teaching Staff:
Prof Eyal Winter

Course/Module description:
The course will deal with research studies in Behavioral Economics and Experimental Economics - the interface between psychology and economics. The papers primarily deal with laboratory experiments that provide insights about economic and strategic behavior. We will start with some frontal lecture after which we shall allocate research paper to students to work in pairs. The final grade will be based on a paper that students will submit at the end of the course. Below is a partial list of the papers.

Course/Module aims:

Learning outcomes - On successful completion of this module, students should be able to:
Understanding economic and strategic behavior. Exposure to the role of laboratory experiments in economic research.

Course grade: will be based on a written assignment submitted at the end of the course.

Attendance requirements(%):

Teaching arrangement and method of instruction:

Course/Module Content:
TI: Which Is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism
AU: Andreoni,-James; Vesterlund,-Lise
SO: Quarterly-Journal-of-Economics. February 2001; 116(1): 293-312.

Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising AU: Andreoni,-James
SO: Journal-of-Political-Economy. December 1998; 106(6): 1186-1213.

Common Pool Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty: Qualitative Tests of Equilibrium Solutions AU: Budescu,-David-V; Rapoport,-Amnon; Suleiman,-Ramzi
SO: Games-and-Economic-Behavior. July 1995; 10(1): 171-201.

TI: Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions
AU: Corns,-Allan; Schotter,-Andrew
SO: American-Economic-Review. March 1999; 89(1): 291-305.

Fehr, E. and A. Falk (1999) “Wage Rigidity in Competitive Incomplete Contract” Journal of Political Economy 104, 1 106-134.

TI: Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All
AU: Gneezy,-Uri; Rustichini,-Aldo
SO: Quarterly-Journal-of-Economics. August 2000; 115(3): 791-810.

Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: Experimental Evidence
AU: Morgan,-John; Sefton,-Martin
SO: Review-of-Economic-Studies. October 2000; 67(4): 785-810.

Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
AU: Nagel,-Rosemarie
SO: American-Economic-Review. December 1995; 85(5): 1313-26.

Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term
AU: Roth,-Alvin-E; Erev,-Ido
SO: Games-and-Economic-Behavior. January 1995; 8(1): 164-212.


A THEORY OF FAIRNESS, COMPETITION,
AND COOPERATION*
ERNST FEHR AND KLAUS M. SCHMIDT

http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/114/3/817.full.pdf

ERC: A Theory of Equity Reciprocity and Competition
Bolton and Ochenfels
http://teaching.ust.hk/~bee/papers/misc/2000-Bolton Theory_Equity_Reciprocity_Competition.pdf

Required Reading:
partial list of papers:
TI: Which Is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism
AU: Andreoni,-James; Vesterlund,-Lise
SO: Quarterly-Journal-of-Economics. February 2001; 116(1): 293-312.

Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising AU: Andreoni,-James
SO: Journal-of-Political-Economy. December 1998; 106(6): 1186-1213.

Common Pool Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty: Qualitative Tests of Equilibrium Solutions AU: Budescu,-David-V; Rapoport,-Amnon; Suleiman,-Ramzi
SO: Games-and-Economic-Behavior. July 1995; 10(1): 171-201.

TI: Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions
AU: Corns,-Allan; Schotter,-Andrew
SO: American-Economic-Review. March 1999; 89(1): 291-305.

Fehr, E. and A. Falk (1999) “Wage Rigidity in Competitive Incomplete Contract” Journal of Political Economy 104, 1 106-134.

TI: Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All
AU: Gneezy,-Uri; Rustichini,-Aldo
SO: Quarterly-Journal-of-Economics. August 2000; 115(3): 791-810.

Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: Experimental Evidence
AU: Morgan,-John; Sefton,-Martin
SO: Review-of-Economic-Studies. October 2000; 67(4): 785-810.

Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
AU: Nagel,-Rosemarie
SO: American-Economic-Review. December 1995; 85(5): 1313-26.

Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term
AU: Roth,-Alvin-E; Erev,-Ido
SO: Games-and-Economic-Behavior. January 1995; 8(1): 164-212.


A THEORY OF FAIRNESS, COMPETITION,
AND COOPERATION*
ERNST FEHR AND KLAUS M. SCHMIDT

http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/114/3/817.full.pdf

ERC: A Theory of Equity Reciprocity and Competition
Bolton and Ochenfels
http://teaching.ust.hk/~bee/papers/misc/2000-Bolton Theory_Equity_Reciprocity

Additional Reading Material:

Course/Module evaluation:
End of year written/oral examination 0 %
Presentation 0 %
Participation in Tutorials 0 %
Project work 100 %
Assignments 0 %
Reports 0 %
Research project 0 %
Quizzes 0 %
Other 0 %

Additional information:
 
Students needing academic accommodations based on a disability should contact the Center for Diagnosis and Support of Students with Learning Disabilities, or the Office for Students with Disabilities, as early as possible, to discuss and coordinate accommodations, based on relevant documentation.
For further information, please visit the site of the Dean of Students Office.
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