Syllabus

WITTGENSTEIN: "PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS" - 15934

Last update 24-02-2014

HU Credits: 2

Degree/Cycle: 2nd degree (Master)

Responsible Department: Philosophy

Academic year: 0

Semester: 2nd Semester

Teaching Languages: Hebrew

Campus: Mt. Scopus

Course/Module Coordinator: Mark Steiner

Coordinator Email: mark.steiner@mail.huji.ac.il

Coordinator Office Hours: M 12:00

Teaching Staff:
Prof Mark Steiner
Course/Module description:
Reading course in the later Wittgenstein

Course/Module aims:
To present a unified interpretation to these texts.

Learning outcomes - On successful completion of this module, students should be able to:
Not relevant for this type of course.

Attendance requirements(%):

Teaching arrangement and method of instruction: Lectures via Powerpoint presentations

Course/Module Content:
Wittgenstein
Hebrew University
Spring, 2014
Mark Steiner
mark.steiner@mail.huji.ac.il

This is a reading course in Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

Required texts:


Requirements for course:
1. Daily assignments based upon the readings for that day. Students will give short
(no longer than one page!) answers to short questions. NO LATE ASSIGNMENTS WILL BE ACCEPTED. On the other hand, up to four assignments may be skipped without penalty. Students who do all assignments will have their lowest four grades discounted.

2. A term paper, maximum fifteen pages long. This is due on the last day of the semester. A suggested topic is the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics (in RFM) and his philosophy of language and of mind in (PI). Other topics are welcome.

3. There will be no midterm and no final in this course. Equal weight will be given to the assignments and the paper.

Assignments

Assignment 1
Read PI, Introduction; sections 1-36.
Question: List three propositions about reference (naming) that Wittgenstein supports.

Assignment 2
Read PI, 37-71.
Question: In what way is reference (naming) like a game? What theses is the analogy intended to refute?

Assignment 3
Read PI, 72-100
Question: What is the point of Wittgenstein's references to "vagueness"? What philosophical theses does he mean to refute?

Assignment 4
Read PI, 101-133
Question: Give two examples from the history of philosophy, of the kind of philosophy Wittgenstein is opposing here.

Assignment 5
Read PI till 155
Question: What arguments does Wittgenstein use to defeat the idea that understanding is a state or a disposition?

Assignment 6
Read PI till 180
Question: Compare Wittgenstein's discussion of the role of causality in reading with Hume's discussion of causality (in the Treatise or the Inquiry).

Assignment 7
Read PI till 200
Question: In 189, Wittgenstein says: "But are the steps then not determined by the
algebraic formula?" [The meaning is: Is it the case, then, that the steps are not determined by the formula? Be careful, because the Hebrew translation could mislead.]--The question contains a mistake.

In light of what Wittgenstein says till 200, what mistake, CONTAINED IN THE QUESTION, is he referring to?

Assignment 8
Read PI till 219
Question: Explain the analogy Wittgenstein makes in 225, between rule:same and proposition:true.

Assignment 9
Read PI till 242
Question: Explain what Wittgenstein means in 242: If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.

Assignment 10
Read PI till 264
Question: The passage 243-264 is often called the Private Language Argument. Find earlier passages which contain versions of this argument, and explain the differences.

Assignment 11
Read RFM, Part I till section 42
Question: Explain the connections between Wittgenstein's account of following a rule and the arguments he gives in the philosophy of mathematics.

A Bibliography

Ben-Menahem, Yemima. 1998. Explanation and description: Wittgenstein on


**Required Reading:**
Wittgenstein
Hebrew University
This is a reading course in Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

Required texts:


Additional Reading Material:

Stern. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dreben, Burton. 1996. Quine and Wittgenstein: the odd couple. In Quine and
Dummett. 1997. Pasquale Frascolla: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics; and
Cristoffer Gefwert: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Mathematics. Journal of
Philosophy 94 (7):359-374.
Dummett, Michael. 1978. Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. In Truth and
Floyd, Juliet. 1991. Wittgenstein on 2, 2, 2...: The opening of Remarks on the
Floyd. 1995. On saying what you really want to say: Wittgenstein, Goedel, and the
trisection of the angle. In Essays on the development of mathematics, edited by J.
Mathematica 9 (3):901-928.
Quarterly 5 (4):267-274.
Wittgenstein, edited by H. Sluga and D. G. Stern. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
York: Routledge.
Gefwert, Christoffer. 1998. Wittgenstein on mathematics, minds, and mental
machines, Avebury series in philosophy. Aldershot, Hants, England ; Brookfield, Vt.:
Ashgate.
Goldfarb, Warren. 1983. I want you to bring me a slab: Remarks on the opening
sections of the Philosophical Investigations. In Synthese.
University Press.
Hackett. 1996. Wittgenstein and Quine: Proximity at great distance. In Quine and
Basil Blackwell.
Kielkopf, Charles F. 1970. Strict finitism; an examination of Ludwig Wittgenstein's

Kreisel, G. 1998. Second thoughts around some of Goedel's writings: a non-
Kripke, Saul. 1992. Logicism, Wittgenstein, and De Re Beliefs About Numbers
Course/Module evaluation:
End of year written/oral examination 0 %
Presentation 0 %
Participation in Tutorials 0 %
Project work 50 %
Assignments 50 %
Reports 0 %
Research project 0 %
Quizzes 0 %
Other 0 %

Additional information: